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IM THE J.UPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RELIANCE NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, .i corporation, 
• . T l . • ' - Kespcudent* 
-vs- Case No. 
JAMES E. CAINE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
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The Respondent submits that the 'u; re - 1 : • . . the 
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State of Utah should affirm the order of the trial court 
dismissing defendant's counterclaim for failure to diligently 
prosecute the same. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 1, 1956, Reliance National Life Insurance 
Company (hereinafter Reliance, or plaintiff), entered into an 
employment agreement with James E. Caine (hereinafter Caine or 
defendant), whereby Caine was employed as an agency supervisor 
for Reliance. After approximately five months, a dispute arose 
between the parties which resulted in the termination of Cainefs 
employment on August 20, 1956, and the initiation of this action 
on October 12, 1956. In the action, after various amendments to the 
pleadings, Reliance sought to recover $6,762.63 from Caine for 
money advances, charges to Reliance's account, and insurance 
premiums collected by Caine but not paid to Reliance. Caine 
filed a counterclaim which after various amendments to the 
pleadings ultimately sought an accounting and a judgment for any 
commissions which the accounting might show. 
Cainefs original counsel withdrew on October 2, 
1957. After Reliance had served Notice of Readiness for Trial 
on January 23, 1960, new counsel appeared for Caine and the 
matter proceeded to trial on a piecemeal basis during 1960. On 
January 5, 1961, the District Court entered a memorandum decision 
that Reliance was entitled to judgment in the sum of $6,762.63, 
and that no complete accounting was ever furnished to Caine. 
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On December 19, 1964, new and third counsel appeared 
for Caine, alleging that certain matters were still before the 
court for determination. However, in March of 1966, Caine's 
third counsel withdrew before any further proceedings in the 
matter were entered in the record. A fourth counsel for Caine filed 
a motion on April 22, 1967, to re-open the case for trial or 
alternatively, to enter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment. Finally, nearly eleven years after the action 
was commenced and seven years after trial, Reliance's counsel 
prepared Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, which 
were signed by the Court on May 3, 1967. The judgment awarded 
Reliance $6,762.63, plus costs, and dismissed Caine!s Counter-
claim. 
Caine gave notice of appeal on May 29, 1967. The 
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the District Court on 
March 28, 1968 and remanded for a new trial. 
During this course of events, Reliance was merged 
into National Western Life Insurance Company (hereinafter 
National) with headquarters in Austin, Texas. Neither counsel 
for Reliance nor counsel for National attempted to go forward 
with a new trial after the decision of the Supreme Court, and 
did not file any pleadings or take any steps with regard to this 
matter, until notified of defendant's motion to set date for 
new trial during October of 1975. 
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Caine filed no pleadings and apparently took no 
other action after the Supreme Court decision until his Motion 
to Set Date for New Trial was filed by another new counsel, the 
fifth for Caine in this matter, on October 17, 19 75. Defendant's 
Motion came within a week of the nineteenth anniversary of the 
filing of this action, and seven and one-half years after the 
decision of the Supreme Court was handed down reversing the 
decision of the District Court. 
National is not aware of the availability of any 
of the witnesses to the 1956 events which gave rise to this 
action, with the exception of Caine. National cannot now locate 
any files, records, accountings, evidence or other material with 
respect to this action. Former counsel for plaintiff has been 
dead for over six years. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO HAVE THIS ACTION 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO RULE 41 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR 
FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO PROSECUTE HIS 
COUNTERCLAIM., 
Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1972) 
provides: 
Involuntary Dismissal. Effect 
thereof for failure of the plaintiff 
to prosecute or to comply with these 
rules or any order of court, a 
defendant may move for dismissal of 
an action or of any claim against him. . . 
Unless the court in its order for 
dismissal otherwise specifies, a 
dismissal under this subdivision . . . 
operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is clear that dismissal on motion of a plaintiff of a 
defendant's counterclaim for failure to prosecute is included 
within Rule 41(b). Rule 41(c), U.R.C.P. (1972), provides: 
Dismissal of Counterclaim, Cross-
Claim or Third-Party Claim. The 
provisions of this rule apply to 
the dismissal of any counter-
claim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim. 
See also, Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 
335 P.2d 624, 626 (1959). 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly reviewed 
dismissals for failure to prosecute. In the case of Brasher 
Motor & Finance Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 (1969), 
the plaintiff had brought a complaint sounding in replevin seeking 
the recovery of several automobiles. After the sheriff made a return 
swearing that the property could not be found, the defendants 
filed a lengthy counterclaim which plaintiff immediately moved 
to dismiss. The matter was then laid to rest by both parties 
for five and one-half years. After this delay, defendants suddenly 
attempted to reactivate the matter. On his own motion, the trial 
judge dismissed the entire case. The Supreme Court held that 
even without looking to Rule 41, the trial court had discretion 
to dismiss an action for want of prosecution on its own motion 
and that the court had not abused its discretion in this case. 
More recently, in Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29 
Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528 (1973), the Supreme Court held that the 
'• - 5 -
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trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants1 
motion to dismiss under Rule 4Kb). The plaintiff had brought 
an action seeking an injunction and damages against several 
defendants for alleged interference with the flow of water in 
plaintiff's ditch. About one year after the original complaint 
was filed, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. About four and one-
hald years later, plaintiff filed a motion to file a second 
amended complaint. Plaintiff did not pursue that motion but 
over two years later, moved that the case be set for pretrial. 
On motion of defendants, the trial court dismissed the action 
for failure to diligently prosecute. The Supreme Court's 
opinion noted that during the seven and one-half years from 
filing of the complaint to motion for pretrial, there had been 
some settlement talks between the parties, although defemdants 
had not offered a compromise. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Vanjonora v. Draper, 
30 Utah 2d 364, 517 P.2d 1320 (1974), again addressed the question 
of dismissal for failure to prosecute. Filing a complaint in 
September, 1969, plaintiff was awarded judgment in October, 1971. 
Nevertheless, the trial court set aside the judgment in May, 
1972. Subsequently, new counsel for the respective parties was 
substituted and numerous offers and counteroffers of settlement 
were made. Finally in December, 1972, the trial court granted 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss as plaintiff could not be contacted 
by his counsel in order to set a trial date. The Supreme Court 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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held that the trial had abused its discretion in dismissing the 
action stating: 
This court only looks to the 
period after judgment was set aside 
in its determination as to whether 
the trial court abused its discretion 
in ordering a dismissal for failure 
to prosecute. 1x3. at 1322. 
The short period of time involved, the substitution of counsel, 
and the negotiations between the parties collectively indicated 
that dismissal was inappropriate. 
Finally, in Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. 
Larsen Contractor, Inc., Utah 2d . , 544 P. 2d 876, 
879 (1975), the Utah Supreme Court concluded: 
Whether there is such justificable 
excuse is to be determined by 
considering more factors than 
merely the length of time since 
the suit was filed. Some 
consideration should be given 
to the conduct of both parties, 
and to the opportunity each has 
had to move the case forward and 
what they have done about it; and 
also what difficulty or prejudice 
may have been caused to the 
other side; and most important, 
whether injustice may result from 
the dismissal. 
In this case, the Supreme Court held that dismissal should not 
have been granted due to the extensive discovery involved and 
defendant's failure to examine documents placed at its disposal. 
(Only 3 years had passed since plaintiff's complaint has been filed). 
Under the facts of the case at bar, it is clear 
-7~ 
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that defendant had as much responsibility as plaintiff to prosecute 
the action after the reversal by the Supreme Court over seven and 
one-half years ago, 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Dismissal §23 at 20-21. 
Nevertheless, defendant has not initiated settlement negotiations, 
he has not sought interim discovery. His only claim*seemingly 
insufficient by itself, is that he has had difficulty in finding 
substitute counsel. Defendant's inaction since the Supreme Court 
reversal has resulted in a severe hardship to plaintiff. Its 
business has been taken over, its counsel has died, and it 
is now unable to locate any material or evidence with respect 
to defendant's counterclaim. As plaintiff in no way hampered 
prosecution of defendant's claim, plaintiff was entitled to have 
this action dismissed with prejudice under Rule 41, U.R.C.P. (1972). 
II. 
DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM SEEKING EQUITABLE 
RELIEF BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES. 
The law in Utah on laches is quite clear and 
comprehensive. In Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises v. Sugarhouse 
Shopping Center Associates, Utah 2d , 535 P.2d 1256 
(1975), the Supreme Court said: 
Laches is not mere delay, but delay 
that works a disadvantage to another. 
To constitute laches, two elements 
must be established: (1) The lack 
of diligence on the part of plaintiff; 
(2) An injury to defendant owing to 
such lack of diligence. Although 
lapse of time is an essential part 
of laches, the length of time must 
depend on the circumstances of each 
case, for the propriety of refusing 
a claim is equally predicated upon 
the gravity of the prejudice suffered Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by defendant and the length of 
plaintiff's delay. [525 P.2d at 12602. 
In Rutherauff v. Silver King W. Mining & Milling, 
95 Utah 279, 300, 80 P.2d 338, 347 (1938), the court said: 
. . . If the complainant has been 
guilty of laches, a court of equity 
will not look into the transaction 
at all. It requires conscience, 
good faith and reasonable diligence. 
These wanting, the court will remain 
passive and leave the parties where it 
finds them. 
An action for an accounting where a fiduciary relation-
ship exists is an equitable action. Newton v. Tracy Loan & Trust 
Co., 88 Utah 547, 40 P.2d 204 (1935). Therefore, defendant's 
counterclaim for an accounting is subject to the equitable bar 
of laches. Jones Mining Co. v. Cardiff Mining & Milling Co., 56 
Utah 449, 191 P. 426 (1920). 
In the case at bar, defendant's lack of diligence in 
prosecuting his counterclaim is manifest from the record. For 
seven and one-half years prior to the filing of defendant's Motion 
to Set Date for New Trial, there is a total absence of any action 
by defendant with respect to his claim. Furthermore, National 
has never been approached by defendant for any reason during the 
seven and one-half year period even though Reliance was merged 
into National prior to the filing of the appeal in 1967. 
With respect to the injuries and prejudice caused to 
plaintiff by defendant's delay, a recitation of the facts manifests 
the inequity of allowing defendant to proceed after his long 
delay. Plaintiff is not now able to locate any accounts, records, 
files, evidence or other matpnaie r.r-14-v, » • Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
claim* Plaintiff is not now aware of any witnesses to the 
transactions which gave rise to the defendant's claim, with 
the exception of the defendant himself. Plaintiff's former 
counsel, who represented Reliance for the first twelve to 
thirteen years of proceedings in this matter, including the 
original trial, is unable to help reconstruct evidence or accounts 
because he has been dead for over six years. 
In Bumingham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 107, 245 Pac. 977, 
983 (1926), the court said: 
•..•'•. . Ordinarily, whether laches 
exists is dependent upon the 
particular facts and circum-
stances of the case. While 
delay is an important factor 
yet mere delay, unless unreasonable 
or inexcusable, is not enough; 
and of equal importance are the 
circumstances occurring during the 
delay, the relation of the parties 
to the subject, disadvantages 
that may have come through loss 
of evidence . . . or injury from 
other causes. [Citing cases. Emphasis 
supplied.] 
Plaintiff has lost evidence and has maintained no 
relation to the subject matter during defendant's delay. Even 
if that were not the case, it would seem extremely difficult 
at best for defendant to show that his delay was reasonable or 
excusable. Defendant's belated attempt to revive his counter-
claim is clearly barred by laches. 
. . .[A] court of equity should always 
insist upon reasonable diligence and not 
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.encourage stale claims and thus 
open the doors of our courts to 
those who have slept upon their 
rights. Jones Mining Co. v. 
Cardiff Mining & Milling Co., 
.56 Utah 449, 469, 191 Pac. 426 
(1920)• 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court's 
Judgment dismissing the Complaint and Counterclaim, which were 
filed nearly twenty years ago, should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES P. COWLEY 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
351 East Second South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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